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Buy It Now: Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants Who
Conduct Business Through Online Intermediaries
Chris Rojao*

I.

Introduction

According to the United States Census Bureau, in 2008, e-commerce retail sales
accounted for approximately 3.6% of all retail sales in the country and generated $142 billion in
revenue.1 A study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimates that in the same year, approximately 73% of all electronic retail sales were conducted
through online retail intermediaries (“online intermediaries”).2 Online intermediaries facilitate
internet transactions for new and used goods by connecting buyers with suppliers, and they
provide a range of services such as a platform for auctions, fixed prices, and transaction
processing.3 One of the largest online intermediaries is eBay.com.4 In June 2011, 223.5 million
people accounting for 16.2% of the world’s Internet population visited eBay.5 The increasing
use of the Internet and online intermediaries—like eBay—by manufacturers and sellers to
distribute their products across the United States has posed significant problems for courts in
determining where these manufacturers and sellers should be subject to personal jurisdiction
when conflicts arise out of their transactions.

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2010, University of
Richmond. I would like to thank Professor Adam Steinman and Seton Hall Law Review Editors Eric Dante and
Desiree Grace for their invaluable advice and comments during the editing process. I would also like to thank my
family, friends, and the F.A.C. for all of their support, without which none of this would be possible.
1
E-Stats, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf.
2
KARINE PERSET, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES 7 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/4/44949023.pdf.
3
See id. at 12.
4
See Dan Rowinski, Amazon’s Websites Saw 20% of the World’s Internet Users in June, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2011/08/17/17readwriteweb-amazons-websites-saw-20-ofthe-worlds-inter-48335.html.
5
Id.
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State and federal courts have struggled with applying the traditional personal jurisdiction
analysis and the other specialized test, the Zippo test, developed to deal specifically with
establishing personal jurisdiction to Internet transactions through online intermediaries.6 This
Comment analyzes the various approaches to establishing personal jurisdiction over businesses
and individuals that conduct business through online intermediaries.

Part II discusses the

development and expansion of personal jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff to International Shoe
Co. v. Washington to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. Part III explains how some
courts have applied these traditional principles to personal jurisdiction with regard to Internet
activity and how others have developed a specialized test for personal jurisdiction with regard to
Internet activity. Part IV illustrates the problems that courts have faced in applying both the
traditional principles of personal jurisdiction and the Zippo test for personal jurisdiction to outof-state defendants that conduct business through online intermediaries by analyzing relevant
case law on the issue. Part V establishes a new “online intermediaries test” that combines
important elements of the Zippo sliding-scale test and the traditional minimum contacts analysis
and is specifically tailored to Internet transactions conducted through online intermediaries. Part
VI applies this new “online intermediaries test” to actual and hypothetical scenarios in order to
demonstrate its practicality. Part VII concludes, urging courts to adopt this approach.
II.

Creation and Development of the Doctrinal Test for Establishing Personal Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is defined as “a government’s general power to exercise its authority over all

persons and things within its territory.”7 This Comment focuses specifically on a court’s power
to exercise its authority over an individual—personal jurisdiction. A valuable explanation of the
6

See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining the
challenges that the Internet poses to personal jurisdiction analysis).
7
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009).
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concept of personal jurisdiction in its early stage of development comes from the 1877 Supreme
Court case Pennoyer v. Neff.8 The Court in Pennoyer explained that a person would not be
bound by a court’s judgment unless the court had properly obtained power over that individual
by statute and under the Constitution.9 In 1877, most state statutes provided that a court properly
obtained power over an individual when that individual was either: (1) served with process
within the territory of the state; or (2) voluntarily appeared to litigate in the state.10 The Court in
Pennoyer brought personal jurisdiction analysis within the confines of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not
constitute due process of law.”11
As the United States began to grow and develop technologically, the expansion of
interstate commerce and travel began to pose significant problems for courts trying to apply
principles from Pennoyer.12

Many states responded by finding creative ways to assert

jurisdiction. One common example was for a state to pass a statute declaring that any individual
driving on state highways consents to have the state appoint an agent for service of process.13 In
Hess v. Pawloski, the Supreme Court explained that in order to be valid, these statutes must be
consistent with the Due Process Clause.14 Then in 1945, the Supreme Court clarified this
principle when it articulated a test for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-consenting,
out-of-state defendants in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.15 The Court established this

8

See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. at 732.
10
Id. at 729–30.
11
Id. at 733.
12
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1980) (noting that a change in personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence is attributable to a “fundamental transformation in the American economy”).
13
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164 (1916).
14
Hess, 274 U.S. at 355.
15
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9
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more flexible test based on a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum state and the
reasonableness of subjecting the defendant to the forum state’s jurisdiction based on those
contacts.16

It also explained that it adopted this test to get rid of the “legal fiction” that

defendants were impliedly consenting to jurisdiction by their “presence in the state through the
acts of its authorized agents.”17 The Court found this test to be in accordance with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 It stated that “due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”19
In International Shoe, the Court also introduced the concepts of general jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction without expressly using these terms.20 The Court suggested that jurisdiction
would apply to individuals and corporations with operations in a particular state that are so
“continuous and systematic” that they could reasonably be subject to jurisdiction in that state,
even for disputes that are distinct from those contacts.21 Nearly forty years later, in Helicopteros
Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court identified this concept explicitly as
“general jurisdiction.”22 Recently, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the
Supreme Court refined the International Shoe standard to require that the contacts be so

16

Id. at 316.
Id. at 318.
18
Id. at 319.
19
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
20
See id. at 318.
21
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within
a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”).
22
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (“When a State exercises
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum, the State has been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”) (citing Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984)); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81 (1980). Cf. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (1966).
17
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continuous and systematic as to render the defendant “essentially at home” in the forum state.23
The Goodyear Court also explained that general jurisdiction typically exists where the individual
is domiciled or the practical equivalent for a corporation.24
While theoretically viable, the Supreme Court has only considered the issue of whether a
defendant’s contacts with a forum state are so continuous and systematic as to subject him to
general jurisdiction in that state in three decisions since International Shoe.25 Alternatively,
specific jurisdiction is the legal principle that most plaintiffs invoke to subject an out-of-state
defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum state.26 Specific jurisdiction requires that: (1) the
defendant corporation or individual have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state; (2)
the claim against him must arise out of, or relate to, those contacts; and (3) jurisdiction over the
defendant must be reasonable.27
Perhaps the main takeaway from International Shoe is that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants, provided that these prospective defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with
that state so that bringing the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”28 In 1980, the Supreme Court articulated four factors for determining whether exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is fair and reasonable in World-Wide

23

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
Id. at 2853–54.
25
See id., at 2846; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408; Perkins v. Bengeut Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
26
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849 (explaining that most of the Court’s decisions have focused on circumstances
surrounding specific jurisdiction).
27
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 427 (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be applicable whenever the cause of
action arises out of or relates to the contacts between the defendant and the forum.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate
agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough
to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.”).
28
See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 323–24.
24

5

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.29

The factors included: (1) “the forum State’s interest in

adjudicating the dispute”; (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief”; (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies”; and (4) “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.”30 In order for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, however, it must have a statutory authority granting it the ability to reach
out beyond its borders.31 Such statutes have become known as “long-arm statutes,”32 and in
response to International Shoe, all fifty states have enacted these statutes or court rules that
define the circumstances under which the state may exercise jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants.33 These statutes can be as expansive as extending the jurisdictional boundaries to the
fullest extent allowable under the U.S. Constitution,34 or limited to requiring either an act or
omission to occur within the state,35 or business to be transacted within the state.36
Assuming that individuals and corporations are not subject to general jurisdiction, and
provided that the state has a long-arm statute granting it jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants, the next question that courts were called upon to answer was: how many contacts
would be enough to satisfy specific jurisdiction under the “minimum contacts” test from
International Shoe? The Supreme Court addressed this issue in McGee v. International Life
29

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 292.
31
Id. at 290–93.
32
A long-arm statute is defined as “[a] statute providing for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has had
contacts with the territory where the statute is in effect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (9th ed. 2009).
33
See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84
B. U. L. REV. 492, 493–96 (2004) (explaining the history and development of long-arm statutes in response to Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington).
34
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2010) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”); N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4 (2010) (“[A]ny
defendant may be served as provided by court order, consistent with due process of law.”).
35
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 2010) (“A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has
jurisdiction over a person . . . [i]n any action claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising
out of an act or omission within this state by the defendant.”).
36
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1993).
30
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Insurance Co., in which an insurance company, through its regional office located in Texas, sold
a life insurance policy to a California man.37 When the man died, the beneficiary of the policy,
Ms. McGee, sued to enforce the policy in California.38 The Supreme Court held that one
contact—the insurance contract—was sufficient to establish jurisdiction, even though the
company had no agents in California nor solicited any business there, because the contact was
substantial and the dispute arose directly from that contact.39
International Shoe and McGee were somewhat limited by the Court’s ruling in Hanson v.
Denckla.40 In Hanson, a Pennsylvania woman established a trust with a Delaware corporation
and subsequently moved to Florida.41 When she died, the beneficiaries of the trust tried to sue
the Delaware corporation in Florida to enforce the agreement.42 The Supreme Court rejected the
notion that Florida had personal jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation, stating that “[t]he
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state.”43

The Court went on to add an

additional feature to International Shoe’s minimum contacts test, requiring “some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”44
This new requirement of purposeful availment created another issue for the courts as they
tried to determine what type of conduct was sufficient to find that the defendant had purposefully
availed itself of the benefits and privileges of the laws of the forum state. In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a defendant purposefully avails himself
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957).
Id.
39
Id. at 221–23.
40
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
41
Id. at 238–39.
42
Id. at 240.
43
Id. at 253.
44
Id. (emphasis added).
37
38
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of the benefits and privileges of a forum state, merely because it is foreseeable that a product he
sells may end up in that state.45
Another mechanism for establishing personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants is
often referred to as the “effects test” established in Calder v. Jones.46 This test is relevant to this
Comment because some courts have applied it to Internet transactions conducted through online
intermediaries. In Calder, a famous singer-actor Shirley Jones filed a lawsuit in California
against the National Enquirer and its writer—both located in Florida—for libel with regard to a
story they published about her.47 The Supreme Court found that the story “concerned the
California activities of a California resident. . . . was drawn from California sources, and the
brunt of the harm . . . was suffered in California.”48 The Court also found that petitioners “edited
an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they
knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and
works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation.”49 The Court concluded
that “[j]urisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their
Florida conduct in California.”50 As a result of Calder, courts have found jurisdiction over outof-state defendants when their conduct is an intentional action expressly aimed at the forum state
and causes an injury or effect in the forum state.51
In sum, the Supreme Court has articulated several elements necessary for a state to assert
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has not consented to its jurisdiction and
does not have continuous and systematic contacts that expose him to general jurisdiction. First,
45

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980).
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
47
Id. at 784.
48
Id. at 788–89.
49
Id. at 789–90 (emphasis added).
50
Id. at 789.
51
See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir. 1998); Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2, 9
(Cal. 2002).
46
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the state must have a statutory grant of authority, usually in the form of a long-arm statute.52 The
defendant must then have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that he has
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of its laws.53 In addition, the claim
against him must arise out of or relate to those minimum contacts.54 Finally, jurisdiction over the
defendant must be reasonable so as to comply with the “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”55 This is essentially the framework that courts have attempted to apply to
personal jurisdiction cases involving activity conducted over the Internet: an area where
territorial boundaries of Internet activity are ambiguous, and an individual’s conduct may cause
an effect in one state or every state almost instantaneously.
III.

The Beginning of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Establishing Jurisdiction Over
Owners and Operators of Websites
The establishment of the Internet and e-commerce caused significant problems for courts

trying to apply the minimum contacts test to individuals who post information and conduct
business over the web.56 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. was one of the first cases to
address the issue of personal jurisdiction with regard to activity conducted over the Internet.57 In
this case, plaintiff Inset, a Connecticut corporation, sued defendant Instruction, a Massachusetts
corporation with no employees or offices in Connecticut, for trademark infringement based on
defendant using the name “Inset” in its website and phone number.58 The court applied the
traditional minimum contacts analysis and found that the defendant had sufficient minimum

52

See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1980); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
718 (1877).
53
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
54
See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
55
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
56
See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of
Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 330–31 (2002).
57
Inset Sys, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
58
Id. at 163 (noting that the defendant listed its website as www.inset.com and used a toll free phone number 1800-US-INSET).

9

contacts with Connecticut because defendant advertised over the Internet and through its toll-free
number, which “reach[ed] as many as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone.”59 The
court’s holding received harsh criticism and many courts chose not to apply this test because the
underlying implication was that anyone advertising over the Internet could be subject to
jurisdiction anywhere the website could be accessed.60
The next case to address the issue of personal jurisdiction with regard to Internet
communications and transactions was Zippo Manufacturing. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., which
adopted a more restrictive approach.61 In Zippo, a Pennsylvania manufacturing company sued a
California Internet news service in Pennsylvania for trademark infringement based on its use of
the name “Zippo” for its websites.62 The court aptly articulated the issue before it, stating, “we
must decide the Constitutionally permissible reach of Pennsylvania’s Long Arm Statute . . .
through cyberspace.”63 The court then reviewed the traditional principles of personal jurisdiction
and found that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is
directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity.”64
In its decision, the court articulated a sliding-scale test for determining whether an
individual purposefully avails himself of a forum state based on his or her conduct over the
internet.65 On one end of the spectrum are active websites where individuals enter into contracts
and conduct business with residents of foreign jurisdictions.66 On the other end are passive
websites where individuals merely post information that is accessible to others in foreign

59

Id. at 165.
See, e.g., Vinten v. Jeantot Marine Alliances, S.A., 191 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 n.10 (D.S.C. 2002); Digital Control,
Inc. v. Boretronics, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
61
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
62
Id. at 1121.
63
Id. at 1120–21.
64
Id. at 1123–24 (emphasis added).
65
Id. at 1124.
66
Id.
60
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jurisdictions.67 In the middle lie “interactive websites” where information is exchanged between
the host computer and users of the website.68 The court indicated that jurisdiction over out-ofstate defendants who maintain “active” websites would be proper, whereas jurisdiction over outof-state defendants who maintain “passive” websites would not.69 With regard to “interactive”
websites, courts would determine jurisdiction “by examining the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.”70
The court explained that personal jurisdiction jurisprudence supports the notion that when
individuals and corporations intentionally reach out to conduct business with residents of other
states, jurisdiction in those states is proper, and this rationale should not change simply because
the business is conducted over the Internet.71 Conversely, the court stated that an out-of-state
defendant does not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and privileges of the laws of the
forum state because users must take it upon themselves to act upon that information, by calling
the number on the site, for example.72 Additionally, the court cited Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold,
Inc. as an example of a case involving an “interactive website” and relied on that court’s
reasoning that the defendant’s website’s active solicitations, promotional activities, and
responses to users accessing the site made jurisdiction proper.73
Applying this test to the case before it, the district court found that defendant’s Internet
news service websites were akin to “active” websites because they conducted substantial
business over the Internet and provided passwords to “approximately 3,000 subscribers in
Pennsylvania and entered into seven contracts with Internet access providers . . . in
67

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
72
Id. at 1125 (citing Bensusan Res. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
73
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124–25.
68
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Pennsylvania.”74 Next, the court concluded that the claim arose out of the defendant’s conduct
in Pennsylvania because “both a significant amount of the alleged infringement and dilution, and
resulting injury . . . occurred in Pennsylvania.”75 Lastly, the court held that jurisdiction was
reasonable in Pennsylvania because of the interest Pennsylvania had in adjudicating disputes
over infringement of trademarks owned by its residents and the plaintiff’s interest in choosing to
seek relief in the state.76 Accordingly, the court found that Pennsylvania had specific jurisdiction
over the defendant.77
Most district and circuit courts have incorporated some variation of the sliding-scale test
articulated in Zippo, and some have even gone further to incorporate the requirement that
defendants “expressly aim” or “target” the forum state through their Internet activities.78 Other
courts have criticized the Zippo sliding-scale test or declined to apply it in favor of traditional
personal jurisdiction analysis.79 Admittedly, the Pennsylvania District Court’s holding in Zippo
was generally tailored to entities that run their own websites and use those websites to conduct
business or to post information and advertisements.80 The question that still remains, which has
haunted courts since the beginning of the twenty-first century, is what happens when the entity
does not own the website itself, but instead conducts business or posts information over a
website owned and operated by a third-party intermediary, such as eBay?

74

Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1127.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA
Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Returning to the Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 74 (2006)
(analyzing cases that have applied the Zippo sliding-scale test to establish personal jurisdiction over the Internet).
79
See, e.g., Instabook Corp. v. Instantpublisher.com., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124–25 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Howard v.
Mo. Bone and Joint Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
80
See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26.
75
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IV.

The Issue of Online Intermediaries: Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Over Individuals
Who Conduct Business Over eBay
This Part will discuss cases that have used the Zippo “sliding scale” test, the traditional

minimum contacts test, or a variation of the Calder “effects test” to determine whether personal
jurisdiction is appropriate over entities that conduct business through eBay as a third-party
intermediary.

When individuals and corporations conduct business through online

intermediaries like eBay, it is especially difficult for courts to determine when a state will have
personal jurisdiction over these entities. The conventional problems—such as lack of territorial
boundaries for where the online activity or effect thereof takes place, and the ability of an entity
to make contact with every state instantaneously—are also present when entities choose to
conduct business via online intermediaries.81 Additionally, since these entities do not own the
websites through which they conduct their business, they pose separate problems for courts
trying to apply the Zippo sliding-scale test. Courts that have addressed the issue of whether
personal jurisdiction exists over out-of-state defendants conducting business through online
intermediaries usually do so in the context of breach of contract, fraud, or misrepresentation
claims.82
The archetypical eBay controversy is as follows: seller S puts a listing up on eBay
indicating that a particular item is for sale for a particular period of time.83 Along with this
listing, S provides a brief description of the item, usually indicating the quality of its condition,
any special features the product might have, and anything else a potential buyer might wish to
know about the product.84 Buyers B, C, and D, then all post “bids” on the item indicating how

81

See Arthur R. Miller, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 GA. L. REV. 991, 995–96 (2004).
See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008); Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1224
(N.H. 2002). But cf. Winfield Collection Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (providing
an example of a copyright-infringement case based on an eBay transaction).
83
See, e.g., Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009).
84
See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014.
82
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much they are willing to pay for the item.85 At the end of the sale period, buyer B has the
highest bid on the item and wins the auction.86 S and B then arrange to have the product
delivered to B’s home, or alternatively, B agrees to travel to the seller to pick up the item.87
When B takes possession of the item, the product is not as B expected it to be, based on S’s
description (or misrepresentation).88 B files a lawsuit against S for breach of contract (or fraud)
in B’s home state and S argues that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.89 State and district
courts throughout the United States have addressed this situation specifically, and others very
similar to it, and have either tried to apply the traditional minimum contacts approach, the
sliding-scale test in Zippo, or the “effects” test articulated in Calder.
A. Courts Applying the Zippo Sliding-Scale Test
In Dedvukaj v. Maloney, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan applied
the Zippo sliding-scale test to answer the question of when personal jurisdiction is proper over an
out-of-state defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary, such as eBay.90 In
Dedvukaj, the plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, sued the defendant, a resident of New York and
sole member of “Mr. Markdown L.L.C.,” for breach of contract after the plaintiff successfully
bid on two pieces of artwork that defendant failed to provide.91 In the defendant’s listing under
the general information heading, he listed the “item location” as “Upstate NY, United States”
and under the “ships to” heading, he listed “United States, Canada, Europe, Asia, [and]
85

See, e.g., Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. App. 2006) (explaining that out of fifty-seven bids,
plaintiff was the highest bidder).
86
See, e.g., Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Ky. 2011).
87
See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014 (noting that plaintiff hired a transport company to deliver car from defendant’s
home state of Wisconsin to plaintiff’s home state of California); Metcalf, 802 A.2d at 1224 (noting that plaintiff
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Australia.”92 The defendant also provided a toll-free number in the listing for interested buyers
to call for more information.93 The auctions lasted for weeks, and during this time the plaintiff
received email updates about the status of the items and the bids entered.94 Additionally, the
plaintiff spoke with the defendant using the toll-free number posted on the listing about the
authenticity of the paintings.95
The court determined that Michigan’s long-arm statute allowed for jurisdiction and
applied the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo to establish the purposeful availment prong of
the minimum contacts analysis.96 The court prefaced its analysis by explaining the need for an
expansive view of personal jurisdiction with regard to transactions through online
intermediaries97:
Internet forums such as eBay expand the seller’s market literally to the world and
sellers know that, and avail themselves of this greatly expanded marketplace. It
should, in the context of these commercial relationships, be no great surprise to
sellers—and certainly no unfair burden to them—if, when a commercial
transaction formed over and through the internet does not meet a buyer’s
expectations, they might be called upon to respond in a legal forum in the buyer’s
home state. Sellers cannot expect to avail themselves of the benefit of the
internet-created world market that they purposefully exploit and profit from
without accepting the concomitant legal responsibilities that such an expanded
market may bring with it.98
The court then explained why the sliding-scale test in Zippo is appropriate to establish the
purposeful availment element of the minimum contacts test.99

It determined that online-

intermediary sites could be categorized as interactive, because sellers can determine the terms of

92

Id.
Id.
94
Id. at 817.
95
Id. at 816.
96
Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See id.
93

15

the sale and post descriptions and pictures of the items for sale.100 Additionally, buyers can
communicate with other buyers and sellers by posting on the listing, and buyers make payments
to the seller in exchange for the item.101
Applying this test to the case before it, the court found that defendant had purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and privileges of conducting business in Michigan.102 The court
reasoned that the defendant communicated with plaintiff frequently via email and telephone
about the listing, uploaded pictures and descriptions of his items, indicated that he would sell
anywhere in the United States and in many countries, accepted payment from Michigan, and was
a sophisticated and extensive user of eBay.103 The court then went on to find that the remaining
elements of the minimum contacts test were met.104 The court determined that the lawsuit arose
out of and was related to the eBay transaction, and jurisdiction over the defendant was
reasonable because the defendant’s connection with Michigan was substantial and the state had
an interest in protecting its citizens from fraud and misrepresentation.105 Accordingly, the court
found that Michigan had personal jurisdiction over the defendants.106
A review of other decisions where courts have applied the sliding-scale test from Zippo
provides insight as to relevant factors that go toward determining the level of interactivity needed
to establish the purposeful availment element and whether jurisdiction over the defendant is
reasonable. Federal and state courts applying the Zippo sliding-scale test to determine whether
personal jurisdiction is appropriate in these situations have ruled both for and against
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defendants.107

First, in Crummey v. Morgan, a Louisiana appellate court found that the

defendant’s interactivity through electronic communications was sufficient to establish
jurisdiction in Louisiana, where the defendant accepted payment from a Louisiana credit card,
provided potential buyers with a telephone number, engaged in additional conversations with
buyers, and used the post to “advertise, puff, negotiate, and accept payment.”108 The court also
indicated an important public policy rationale for finding that personal jurisdiction exists over
these defendants.109 The court theorized that holding otherwise would have a chilling effect on
e-commerce because buyers, wary of having to litigate in the home courts of out-of-state sellers,
“will refrain from purchasing goods on eBay . . . should the merchandise they considered
purchasing be defective or otherwise not conform to the advertised online representations.”110
Second, in Hinners v. Robey, the Supreme Court of Kentucky also applied the slidingscale test from Zippo, but it determined that it could not establish personal jurisdiction over a
defendant eBay seller from Missouri.111 In Hinners, a Kentucky plaintiff bid on, and ultimately
won the auction for a Cadillac Escalade that the Missouri defendant had put up for sale.112 The
defendant’s listing stated that the Cadillac had no prior accident damage, no electrical problems,
and was in good condition.113 The plaintiff traveled to Missouri to complete the deal and acquire
possession of the vehicle.114 Shortly after returning to Kentucky with the vehicle, the plaintiff
began having problems with the electrical system and took it to a mechanic who discovered that
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there had been extensive work done on the car due to prior collisions.115 The plaintiff filed suit
against the defendant in Kentucky for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of warranty, and
the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted certification.116
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the sliding-scale test from Zippo and found that the
defendant did not purposefully avail himself of the privileges of Kentucky.117

The court

explained that the defendant “did not limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky or target his
advertisement to Kentucky residents, and in fact could not know the resident state of the
successful bidder until the auction was complete.”118 It stated that the eBay listing was akin to a
“passive Internet website” that “does little more than make information available to those who
are interested.”119 Also relevant to its conclusion was the fact that the delivery of the item was
concluded outside of Kentucky.120 Based on this analysis, the court ultimately concluded that to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be constitutionally improper.121
Perhaps the most important thing to take away from these cases is their use of the slidingscale test to assess the purposeful availment aspect of the minimum contacts test. As previously
discussed in Part II, combining the analysis from McGee v. Int’l. Life Ins. Co. and Hanson v.
Denckla, one contact may be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant if the contact is substantial, and the defendant purposefully avails himself of the
benefits and privileges of the forum state through that contact.122 These cases also illustrate that
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courts can apply the Zippo sliding-scale test to transactions conducted over online intermediaries
to establish the purposeful availment prong of the traditional minimum contacts test, while still
maintaining the other traditional elements of establishing personal jurisdiction.123 Each of these
cases also required that the claim arise out of or relate to the eBay transaction and for jurisdiction
over the defendants to be reasonable.
Importantly, in Hinners the court listed relevant factors in considering whether the
defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Kentucky.124 The
court stated that since the seller did not “limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky,” could not
know that the winning bidder was a resident of the state of Kentucky, did not select the winning
bidder, and completed the delivery outside of Kentucky, the defendant did not purposefully avail
himself of the benefits and privileges of conducting business in Kentucky.125 Similarly, in
Crummey the court listed relevant factors supporting its finding that the defendant had
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Louisiana.126 The court found that
since the defendants expanded their market by using eBay as an intermediary, accepted an
original down payment for the vehicle with a credit card sent from Louisiana, and provided the
plaintiff with a telephone number to engage in additional communications about the defendant,
they purposefully availed themselves of the protections of Louisiana law.127
Again, in Dedvukaj the court also listed the factors it considered relevant to determining
that defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and privileges of
Michigan.128 In making its decision, the court considered the fact that the defendants stated that
123
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they would deliver their paintings anywhere in the United States, that the defendants provided
the plaintiff with a phone number and email address in order to contact them, and that they
provided their own terms and conditions, logos, and marketing information in their listing.129
These cases effectively illustrate which factors courts will consider as relevant to determining
whether an out-of-state defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary has
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of a forum state in order to establish
personal jurisdiction over that defendant.130
B. Courts Applying Traditional Minimum Contacts Analysis
Some courts, however, have refused to abandon the traditional approach in resolving the
issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state defendant conducting business
through an online intermediary. The Ninth Circuit applied traditional personal jurisdiction
analysis in resolving this issue in Boschetto v. Hansing.131

In Boschetto, the plaintiff, a

California resident, used eBay to purchase an antique car from the defendant, a resident of
Wisconsin.132 The parties communicated through email and arranged to deliver the car to
California from Wisconsin.133 Upon receiving the car, Boschetto realized that the car was not
the specific “R Code” model that the defendant advertised and found other significant problems
with the engine and body of the car.134 Boschetto subsequently sued defendant in California for
breach of contract and fraud.135 The court expressly stated that the sliding-scale test articulated
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in Zippo was inapplicable in this type of situation because the defendant did not own or operate
the eBay website.136
The court equated the eBay listing as an advertisement, stating that “the eBay listing was
not part of broader e-commerce activity; the listing temporarily advertised a good for sale and
that listing closed once the item was sold, thereby extinguishing the Internet contact for this
transaction within the forum state (and every other forum).”137 Thus, the court applied the
traditional minimum contacts analysis articulated in International Shoe to the online transaction
and found that defendant’s one sale over eBay to the California plaintiff was not a sufficient
contact to allow the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.138 The court did
note, however, that a defendant who conducts business over eBay might be subject to personal
jurisdiction in a forum state when he uses eBay “as a means for establishing regular business
with a remote forum such that finding personal jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’”139
One potential benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Boschetto is that it is consistent
with traditional long-range transactions that do not involve the Internet, and courts can look to
case law that addressed these situations for support and guidance as to how much contact with
the forum state is sufficient.
problems as well.

The court’s holding, however, poses a number of potential

First, if the defendant was actually wrong and made a number of

misrepresentations in the description of the vehicle, the plaintiff may have no recourse, as the
cost of traveling to Wisconsin to litigate may be too burdensome for the individual plaintiff.
Additionally, the court failed to address the significance, if any, of the communication via email
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that plaintiff and defendant exchanged in arranging the delivery of the car to California and
whether or not that communication may contribute towards the defendant’s “minimum contacts”
with California.
Once again, reviewing other courts that have applied the traditional minimum contacts
tests in these types of situations reveals relevant factors that these courts consider in deciding
whether the defendant’s contacts with the state are sufficient and whether it is reasonable to
subject the defendant to jurisdiction. Federal and state courts in other jurisdictions following this
approach have generally found that the contacts through the online intermediaries were
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, describing them as attenuated, random, and fortuitous.140
Notably, many of these courts rely on the fact that the defendant has “no control over the
winning bidder,” and as a result, the contact with the forum state is random and fortuitous.141
This view, however, ignores reality. In fact, sellers are able to control who (or at least where)
the winning bidder will be. Sellers are able to control the information that is posted in the
“description” and “shipping and payments” sections of their listings on eBay.142 Sellers may
choose which forum states they will agree to ship to and with whom they will conduct
business.143

Most sellers, however, seek to maximize the number of potential buyers and

increase the sale price of their item, intentionally choosing to avail themselves of the benefits of
conducting business with every state.
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At least one court has applied the traditional minimum contacts test to an out-of-state
defendant conducting business over eBay and found that personal jurisdiction was appropriate.144
In Malcolm v. Esposito, the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, won an auction to purchase a car on
eBay from defendant agents of a car dealership located in Connecticut.145 After the auction
ended, the parties contacted each other by email and phone and the defendants arranged to ship
the car from California to Virginia.146 Before the defendants shipped the car, the plaintiff
discovered a manufacturing defect with the car and tried to cancel his purchase of the vehicle,
but the defendants refused to allow the plaintiff to revoke the agreement.147 The plaintiff
subsequently sued the defendants in Virginia for fraud and breach of warranty.148
The court first concluded that the Virginia long-arm statute allowed the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant because the “formation of the contract for sale of the [car]
occurred in Virginia.”149 Turning to the constitutional inquiry, the court found that the Zippo
sliding-scale analysis was not “particularly instructive” because it primarily dealt with
defendants who operate and conduct transactions through their own website.150 Accordingly, the
court applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis.151 The court listed several factors that
were relevant to its decision: (1) the defendants were commercial sellers of the item and had
conducted over 213 transactions to many different states through eBay; (2) the defendants
represented that they had eBay customers locally, nationally, and internationally; (3) the
defendants anticipated transactions with out-of-state buyers because they sent an email to the
144
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plaintiffs requesting a copy of the plaintiff’s driver’s license if he was an out-of-state resident;
and (4) the nature of the product, an automobile, was intended to be delivered to and driven in
Virginia.152 Based on an analysis of these factors under the traditional minimum contacts test,
the court found that jurisdiction over the defendant in Virginia was proper.153
C. Courts Applying the Calder Effects Test
At least one court has attempted to apply an “effects” test similar to the one in Calder to
determinations of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who conduct business over
online intermediaries.154 In Erwin v. Piscitello, the plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, purchased
a classic automobile advertised as being in “mint condition” from the defendant, a resident of
Texas.155 The plaintiff and the defendant made and received several calls about the car, during
which the defendant reinforced the quality and condition of the car.156 The defendant ultimately
delivered the car to the plaintiff in Tennessee through his own driver and car hauler.157 Two
days after the plaintiff received the car, he discovered it was not in mint condition and several of
the original parts had been replaced, contrary to the defendant’s representations.158
The court first explained that Tennessee’s long-arm statute allowed for personal
jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the United States Constitution and as a result
merged the constitutional and statutory analyses.159 The court then applied an effects test and
concluded that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of
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Tennessee’s laws.160 The court found that the defendant “knowingly interacted with a Tennessee
resident” and persuaded the plaintiff to purchase the vehicle based on representations about the
vehicle that were ultimately discovered to be untrue.161 In doing so, the court emphasized that
“[the defendant’s] knowing and intentional conduct caused foreseeable ill effects in-state.”162
Based on these factual determinations, the court concluded that it was “reasonably foreseeable
for Defendant to be haled into court in Tennessee when the transaction soured.”163
Most courts have chosen not to discuss whether an “effects test” is applicable in the
context of Internet transactions through online intermediaries like eBay.164 Instead, these courts
have chosen to address this issue under the Zippo sliding-scale analysis or under the traditional
minimum contacts analysis.165 At least one court has explicitly declined to follow the analysis
set forth in Erwin in the context of establishing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary.166 Additionally, the court in
MacNeil v. Trambert discussed the difficulty of trying to apply the effects doctrine to Internet
transactions over online intermediaries like eBay.167 First, the court indicated that the “effects
doctrine” is generally applied to intentional tort cases, and thus is inapplicable to breach-ofcontract cases in the eBay context.168 This means that the effects test would only be applicable
to fraud and misrepresentation cases.169 Next, the court pointed out the difficulty in establishing
the location of the tortious act in a multi-state transaction, whether it occurs when the defendant
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accepts payment for the defective good or when the plaintiff obtains possession of the defective
good.170 Consequently, if the plaintiff chooses to pick up the defective good in the defendant’s
state, or authorizes an agent to do so, the location of the acceptance of payment and deliverance
of possession would both be in the defendant’s state.171 As a result, the plaintiff would have no
recourse in his own state and would have to travel to the defendant’s state to file his lawsuit.
Currently, Erwin is the only case that has used the “effects test” to find personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant conducting business through online intermediaries.
Although it is only one case, Erwin illustrates that an effects test remains a viable option for
courts to consider in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over an individual who
conducts business over eBay or some other online intermediary. But as the court in MacNeil
pointed out, applying this test in the context of Internet transactions over online intermediaries
can be problematic. Until courts adopt a more uniform standard for establishing personal
jurisdiction under these circumstances, courts will continue to struggle in determining which
analysis to apply and which factors are relevant to assessing the reasonableness of jurisdiction.
V. The “Online Intermediaries Test”
A review of the existing commentary on this issue illustrates that, just like the courts,
scholars and commentators disagree about what the proper test should be under these
circumstances.172 Some commentators argue that courts should stick to the traditional minimum
contacts analysis for long-range transactions and not get distracted by the fact that the business
was conducted over the Internet on the eBay website.173 One commentator suggested that state
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legislatures amend their respective state’s long-arm statutes to preclude personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state residents who conduct business over third-party websites such as eBay and
Amazon.174 Some other commentators have suggested that general jurisdiction could apply to
the actual websites of eBay or Amazon.175 In line with this argument is the question of whether
these websites’ most prominent users could also be subject to general jurisdiction if through
these online intermediaries, they have continuous and systematic contacts with every state in the
United States. This would mean that jurisdiction would be proper over these “super-sellers” in
any state where a buyer files a claim against them. No commentator, however, has argued in
favor of creating a specific test for online intermediaries by incorporating a modification of the
Zippo sliding-scale test along with elements of the traditional minimum contacts test.
An analysis of the relevant case law on establishing personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants who conduct business through online intermediaries makes clear that the best test for
establishing personal jurisdiction is one that combines and implements the most important
elements of the prevalent cases.176 The following online-intermediary test combines many
elements from the cases previously mentioned.177 First, it applies principles from the Zippo
sliding-scale test and looks at the interactivity and features of the bid, post, or listing on the
online intermediary to determine whether the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the
forum state.178 Then, it maintains the requirements of the minimum contacts test that the conflict
must (1) arise out of or relate to the transaction; and (2) that jurisdiction over the defendant must
be reasonable.179
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The most fluent articulation of this test, derived from Dedvukaj,180 Hinners,181 and
Crummey182 is as follows: an out-of-state defendant who conducts business over a third-party
intermediary, such as eBay or Amazon, is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state when:
(1) that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts whereby he purposefully avails himself of the
benefits and privileges of the state as determined by the level of interactivity available to
potential buyers in the forum state through the listing; (2) the claim against him arises out of
those contacts; and (3) after an analysis of the relevant factors, jurisdiction over the defendant is
reasonable such that it complies with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The unique aspect of this approach derives from determining whether the defendant purposefully
avails himself of the forum state by looking at the interactivity of the post or listing on the online
intermediary itself.

As previously mentioned, eBay users and users of similar online

intermediaries have a significant amount of control over the information they post in their listing
and how the transaction is ultimately concluded.183 The more passive the seller is in posting
information, arranging for shipping, and soliciting potential buyers in various states through his
or her listing, the less likely the defendant will have purposefully availed himself of a forum state
where his product is ultimately sold and vice versa.
In all of the cases where courts have struggled to determine whether personal jurisdiction
can be established over an out-of-state defendant that conducts business through an online
intermediary, these courts have mentioned several factors that are considered relevant to the
inquiry.184 After reviewing these cases, it is now possible to determine which factors courts cite
180
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most frequently and give the most weight to in reviewing this issue. These factors are intended
to serve as a guide for future courts reviewing this issue. Courts that have applied one of the
three articulated personal jurisdiction tests have come to different conclusions in factually similar
cases because they differ on one or two of the factors listed below.185
The following factors that courts should consider in determining whether the defendant’s
bid is sufficiently interactive such that he or she purposefully avails himself or herself of the
forum state are: (1) the number of transactions between the seller and the forum state through the
online intermediary;186 (2) whether and to what extent the defendant coordinates and pays for the
product to be shipped to the buyer’s home state, physically or through an agent who delivers the
product to the buyer’s state, or whether the defendant requires the buyer to come to the
defendant’s state to take possession of the product;187 (3) whether the defendant posts contact
information such as an email address, website, or telephone number in the bid and intends to
make contact with buyers in the forum state in ways other than through the listing on the
intermediary;188 (4) whether the defendant knows the buyer’s location, establishing that he has
knowledge that he is conducting business with the forum state;189 and (5) whether the defendant
is an individual or corporation who frequently conducts business through online
intermediaries.190 Courts addressing the issue of out-of-state defendants conducting business
through online intermediaries have cited these factors most frequently as relevant to its
determination of personal jurisdiction.
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The “reasonableness” element of the test is also an important inquiry that courts should
not overlook. The online-intermediaries test borrows the traditional factors from World-Wide
Volkswagen in determining whether jurisdiction over the defendant would be reasonable as to
comply with the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”191 These factors
include: (1) the burden litigation will have on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in the
litigation; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; and (4) the national judicial interest in
securing an efficient resolution of the dispute.192 The value of the product that forms the basis of
the transaction should also be relevant to this inquiry. The statutory requirement that a matter
must exceed $75,000 for federal diversity jurisdiction will prevent many claims from reaching
federal courts; however, state courts should be hesitant to require a defendant to travel across the
country to defend himself over an inexpensive contract dispute.193
VI. Applying the Online Intermediaries Test in Real and Hypothetical Scenarios
The following example illustrates the practicality and feasibility of the onlineintermediaries test. Consider the facts of Erwin v. Piscitello.194 The issue of whether personal
jurisdiction exists over the defendant in Erwin can be resolved with the same outcome under the
online-intermediaries test. In Erwin, the plaintiff viewed the defendant’s eBay post for a car for
sale and used the information in the post to email the defendant to inquire about that car, to
which the defendant responded.195

Had that been the full extent of the defendant’s

communications with the plaintiff, he would not have purposefully availed himself of Tennessee
law under the online-intermediaries test. The defendant, however, chose to re-initiate contact
with the plaintiff and sent a number of emails and phone calls to the plaintiff seeking to gauge
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his interest in the car.196 Additionally, when the defendant discovered that the plaintiff would
not be able to pick the car up in Texas as previously believed, the defendant arranged for a car
hauler to deliver the car to the plaintiff’s home in Tennessee.197 From the communications and
the fact that the seller arranged to deliver the car to Tennessee, it is evident that the defendant
knew he was dealing with a plaintiff from Tennessee.198
Based on these facts, the defendant in Erwin purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and privileges of Tennessee by interacting with the plaintiff buyer on multiple levels. The next
inquiry about whether the claim arises out of the transaction is easily satisfied because the claim
arises out of the dispute over the condition of the car.199 Finally, looking at whether jurisdiction
over the defendant would be reasonable, the facts show that Tennessee has a strong interest in
protecting its citizens from fraudulent misrepresentations, that the defendant was easily able to
secure transportation for the car to Tennessee, and that the car was worth $50,000.200 As a result,
under the online-intermediaries test, personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the dispute
regarding the car would be appropriate in Tennessee.
An alternative hypothetical example illustrates when personal jurisdiction would not be
appropriate over an out-of-state defendant conducting business through an online intermediary.
Suppose a seller lists a bullwhip201 on eBay that Harrison Ford used to portray the character
“Indiana Jones” in the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark.202 The defendant is a resident of New
Jersey, an attorney by profession, and has only used eBay once before to sell his mother’s fine
china to a buyer from New York. In his eBay listing, he includes a brief description of the whip,
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indicating that Harrison Ford used it in the film and stating that the buyer is responsible for
pickup or delivery and must pay all shipping costs from New Jersey. The potential buyer is an
avid movie buff who lives in Idaho and is always on the lookout for movie relics on eBay and
other auction sites. The buyer sees the listing and decides he must have the whip. The buyer
then submits a bid for $15,000 and after one week, he wins the auction. When the buyer receives
the whip, he questions its authenticity by watching the movie with his whip in hand. The buyer
brings a lawsuit against the seller in Idaho for breach of contract and fraud based on the alleged
misrepresentations in the eBay listing.
Through an application of the online intermediaries test, a court in Idaho would not be
able to establish personal jurisdiction over the seller. The seller never made a sale to Idaho
through eBay before, and his previous sale of fine china to New York is not sufficient to
establish that the he is engaged in the business of selling movie relics or fine dishware through
online auction sites. The seller did not post any contact information in the bid indicating that he
would attempt to contact individuals by other methods other than through the eBay listing.
Additionally, he indicated that the plaintiff was responsible for the pickup or delivery and
subsequent costs of the item from New Jersey. Even though the seller chose not to limit his sale
to any specific state but instead allowed his bullwhip to be sold anywhere in the United States,
this factor alone is not sufficient to overcome the other factors that indicate he has not
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Idaho. Thus, through this passive
conduct, the seller never purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of
conducting business in Idaho, and therefore, he cannot reasonably expect to be haled into court
in Idaho to defend against this lawsuit.
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These examples show that courts can practically apply the online-intermediaries test to
different factual scenarios involving transactions conducted over eBay or other online
intermediaries with relative uniformity. The more sellers choose to engage buyers in a particular
forum state through their listing and communication and negotiation outside of the listing, the
more likely they will be subject to personal jurisdiction in that state. Conversely, the more
passive they are in listing and soliciting communication and interest from potential buyers
outside of the posts by only responding to buyer inquiries, the less likely they will be subject to
personal jurisdiction. This test still allows sellers to exploit the benefits of selling their products
through an online intermediary such as eBay and to protect themselves from liability in a foreign
jurisdiction. It provides, however, that if they choose to actively solicit and target customers in a
foreign state or conduct a significant amount of business with a foreign state through that
intermediary, then they cannot claim that it is unreasonable for them to be called into court in
that state.

As a result, this online intermediaries test strikes an appropriate balance of

reasonableness and fairness.
VII. Conclusion
Upon reviewing the relevant case law regarding personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants who conduct business with the forum state over online intermediaries, it is clear that
there is a lack of uniformity amongst courts. Notably, almost all courts have maintained some or
all of the elements of the traditional minimum contacts analysis for determining personal
jurisdiction in these cases.203

Some courts have maintained all of the elements from

International Shoe Co. and applied them to these situations, with the majority of these courts
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finding that one or two sales with the forum state is insufficient to establish minimum contacts to
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant seller.204 Others have applied the sliding-scale
test in Zippo based on the interactivity of the commercial business to satisfy the purposeful
availment element of the minimum contacts analysis.205 These courts have found both for and
against establishing personal jurisdiction over these defendants based on the level of interactivity
they provide in their listings and advertisements. One court has found that if the actions of these
defendants conducting business through these online intermediaries caused an effect in the forum
state, then even one contact with the forum state might be sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction.206
This Comment argues for an analytical test, which combines the two major approaches to
this issue. Courts should apply the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo to determine whether
the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of the forum state
through his contacts of the sale listing. Next, courts should determine whether the claim arises
out of, or relates to, the contact. Finally, these courts should determine whether jurisdiction over
the defendant would be reasonable such that it would comply with “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice” based on the factors articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen.207
Courts and commentators have struggled with the issue of how to assert personal
jurisdiction over individuals who conduct business over online intermediaries since immediately
after the creation and increase in popularity of third-party intermediary sites like eBay and
Amazon.

This approach is a push toward uniformity in an area of much disparity and
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disagreement. This “online intermediaries test” seeks to provide guidelines for buyers and
sellers conducting business over online intermediaries to know exactly where they may be called
upon to address issues with regard to their purchases and sales in a court of law.
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